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Framing Address: A Framework for Analyzing Financial 
Market Transformation 
Steven L. Schwarcz* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The title of this Symposium originally was “Rethinking Financial 
and Securities Markets.” It is, of course, somewhat presumptuous for 
scholars to try to rethink financial markets per se. Markets, including 
financial markets, are driven primarily by supply and demand. But schol-
ars can and should try to influence the future of financial markets by re-
thinking their fundamental aspects. 
This Symposium presents work from leading scholars in the fields 
of law, economics, finance, and accounting. I will try to frame the dis-
cussion from the perspectives of these four disciplines. 
First, however, we need to identify what it is about financial mar-
kets that is worth rethinking. I will focus on ways in which financial 
markets have been changing. They are increasingly decentralized and 
fragmented. They are increasingly direct sources of firm capital—a pro-
cess called disintermediation.1 They are increasingly global. They are 
increasingly creating funding mismatches, as short-term securities are 
used to finance long-term capital needs.2 And they (as well as financial 
market products) are increasingly complex and obscure to market partic-
ipants, even with full disclosure. I will refer to these “financial market 
changes” throughout my talk. 
                                                 
* Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law, and Founding Di-
rector, Duke Global Capital Markets Center; schwarcz@law.duke.edu. I thank Emilios Avgouleas, 
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Charles O’Kelley, and participants in the Fourth Annual Symposium (“The Future of Financial and 
Securities Markets”) of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center for Corporations, Law and Society for helpful 
comments and Shaun Barnes for valuable research assistance. 
 1. Disintermediation technically refers to the removal of the need for bank intermediation 
between the sources of funds (the capital and other financial markets) and the users of funds (for 
example, firms that operate in the real economy, such as AT&T or General Motors). 
 2. See infra notes 60–70 and accompanying text. 
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II. PERSPECTIVES 
Focusing on these financial market changes, I will frame the dis-
cussion from the perspectives of law, economics, finance, and account-
ing. 
From the perspective of law, we should examine whether financial 
regulation is keeping pace with these market changes. In that context, we 
should also contemplate whether regulation itself can, and should, influ-
ence these changes. 
From the perspective of economics, we should examine how these 
financial market changes are affecting efficiency, the costs of supplying 
financial capital, and ultimately, the real economy. 
From the perspective of finance,3 we should examine how these fi-
nancial market changes intersect with market organization. For example, 
how should organizational reform address the funding of long-term capi-
tal needs from short-term market sources—a mismatch that makes li-
quidity crises more likely to occur? 
From the perspective of accounting, we should rethink financial in-
formation disclosure in light of these market changes. Do existing ac-
counting rules and principles adequately disclose the risks of decentral-
ized, fragmented, and mismatched funding? To what extent are such 
rules and principles harmonized for global markets, and to what extent 
do they need to be harmonized? 
All of these perspectives are interrelated, of course. Fundamentally, 
the normative goals of law, economics, finance, and accounting are the 
same: to optimize financial markets to enable capital formation. Finan-
cial markets are “crucial for the allocation of resources in a modern 
economy. They channel household savings to the corporate sector and 
allocate investment funds among firms. They allow intertemporal 
smoothing of consumption by households and expenditures by firms. 
                                                 
 3. I recognize that there is an increasing overlap between finance scholarship and economic 
scholarship, but there remains a meaningful difference in this context. See E-mail from Simon 
Gervais, Assoc. Professor of Fin., Fuqua Sch. of Bus., Duke Univ., to author (Feb. 13, 2012) (on file 
with author) (responding to author’s query asking, “[F]rom the standpoint of examining financial 
markets, how would you (briefly) describe the difference between what finance professors do and 
economics professors do?”).  
The line is not that clear, but I would say that financial economists probably concentrate 
more on the investment and asset pricing sides of finance than economists do. That is, 
economists are more interested in the real side of finance (growth, general equilibrium, 
credit, banking, etc.), whereas financial economists spend more time on portfolio for-
mation, return and trading volume patterns, and partial equilibrium models. I would also 
say that the recent crisis has closed the gap between the two groups. 
Id. 
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They allow both firms and households to share risks.”4 Law, economics, 
finance, and accounting proceed from distinct perspectives with varied 
toolkits to achieve these goals.5 
At times, the perspectives and toolkits of one discipline can seem 
inaccessible or inadequate to scholars of another discipline. Economists 
and finance scholars, for example, often rely on abstract models, whereas 
legal scholars often engage more of the messiness of reality. Both ap-
proaches, however, can have merit. Also, economists and finance schol-
ars often see pricing as an important proxy for efficiency. In contrast, 
legal scholars usually examine broader consequences. But these analyses 
can be complementary. Even though legal scholars rarely discuss pricing, 
they usually are familiar with efficiency concepts, including Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency and Pareto optimality.6 Finally, economists and finance 
scholars have strong incentives to test their models empirically—an ap-
proach known as hypothetico-deductivism. Legal scholars engage less in 
empirical work and more in theory.7 Theoretical inquiry, however, can be 
valuable,8 whereas empirical inquiry can sometimes be misleading if it 
relies on imperfect modeling based on a flawed assumption or imperfect 
data.9 
                                                 
 4. FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 3–4 (2000) (de-
scribing the traditional purposes ascribed to financial markets). While capital formation and alloca-
tion are the most fundamental functions of financial markets, others have been suggested. Large, 
deep equity markets serve as a “market for corporate control,” in H.G. Manne’s famous phrase. 
Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965). 
Risk sharing and risk transfer, while traditional components of the allocation function, have taken on 
increased salience in recent years with the advent of transactions like securitization that facilitate the 
disintermediation of financial markets. Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for a New Century: Some 
Observations on the ‘Big-Picture’ Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 157, 162 (2008). 
 5. Law and accounting, for example, help to reduce information-asymmetry costs by increasing 
transparency through disclosure—risk disclosure in the case of law, financial information disclosure 
in the case of accounting. 
 6. For example, Federal Reserve economists Tobias Adrian and Adam B. Ashcraft focus heavi-
ly on pricing. TOBIAS ADRIAN & ADAM B. ASHCRAFT, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK 
STAFF REPORTS, NO. 559: SHADOW BANKING REGULATION (2012), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr559.pdf. I have independently analyzed shad-
ow-bank regulation using more generic market-failure terminology. Our analyses, however, are 
complementary. See infra note 31. 
 7. Even empiricists often rely on theory, however, to formulate hypotheses that are the basis of 
the models being tested. 
 8. Cf. Kevin A. Clarke & David M. Primo, Overcoming ‘Physics Envy,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 
2012, at SR 9 (observing that “theoretical models can be of great value even if they are never sup-
ported by empirical testing”). 
 9. Cf. id. (“Rather than attempt to imitate the hard sciences, social scientists [such as econo-
mists] would be better off doing what they do best: thinking deeply about what prompts human 
beings to behave the way they do.”). 
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The Symposium description also asks whether financial markets are 
still socially relevant institutions. Empirically, I believe the answer is 
yes: markets respond to actual societal needs. My talk assumes there is 
and will continue to be a significant need for financial capital. If that 
need diminishes, the question will be less important. And if non-
financial-market sources of capital become less expensive than market 
sources, users of capital will vote with their feet.10 
In these inquiries, I would urge us to expand our focus beyond eq-
uity securities. The debt markets—which include markets for corporate 
bonds, commercial paper, covered bonds, and securitization—are in-
creasingly important sources of financial capital11 and are also the most 
rapidly changing financial markets.12 
III. ANALYSIS 
I now consider, in more depth, how the perspectives of law, eco-
nomics, finance, and accounting provide distinct, yet overlapping, 
frameworks for analysis of the future of financial markets. 
                                                 
 10. Even banks obtain a significant portion of their funds from the financial markets. Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Disintermediating Avarice: A Legal Framework for Commercially Sustainable Micro-
finance, 11 U. ILL. L. REV. 1165, 1169 n.19 (2011). 
 11. The amount of outstanding domestic debt securities issued by U.S. financial institutions 
and corporate issuers was $14.058 trillion in December 2010. See Securities Statistics and Syndicat-
ed Loans, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Sept. 2012), http://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm. 
By contrast, the World Bank lists the total market capitalization of listed U.S. companies at the end 
of 2010 as $17.139 trillion. Market Capitalization of Listed Companies (Current US$), WORLD 
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD (last visited Oct. 4, 2012); cf. Mor-
timer B. Zuckerman, No Time to Lose, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 2009, at 80 (observing that 
securitization “once accounted for 70 percent of our credit while conventional bank lending had 
dropped to 30 percent”). 
 12. There is, of course, a trend in equity markets toward more global consolidation, especially 
of formal, established markets. See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States 
and Europe: Automation, Globalization, and Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 497, 498–
99 (2001). This trend is perhaps best exemplified by the merger of the New York Stock Exchange 
with its European rival, Euronext N.V.; see, for example, Aaron Lucchetti et al., NYSE, Euronext Set 
Plan to Form a Markets Giant, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2006, at A1, and the abortive attempt of the 
resulting NYSE Euronext to merge with Germany’s Deutsche Boerse. Deutsche Boerse: Brussels 
Blocks NYSE Merger, BUS. WEEK (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/ 
D9SKHD800.htm. In part, consolidation is a response to growing competition from decentralized 
electronic communication networks (ECNs) that brought automation to equity markets in the 1990s. 
Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading 
Floors and the Rise of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 908–11 (2008). Thus, it may be that the very de-
centralization inherent in the rise of certain shadow-banking markets may be putting pressure on 
traditional stock exchanges to move in the opposite direction and consolidate to survive. 
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A. A Legal Framework: Rethinking Market Regulation 
Is financial regulation keeping pace with these financial market 
changes?13 I will first focus on disintermediation and the resulting decen-
tralization and fragmentation. Then, I will separately focus on increasing 
financial market globalization. 
1. Disintermediation, Decentralization, and Fragmentation 
Disintermediation, and the resulting decentralization and fragmen-
tation of financial markets, are associated with the rise of shadow bank-
ing. Although the term is not well defined, “shadow banking” generally 
means the provision of financial products and services other than through 
traditional banking.14 These products and services are provided by so-
called “shadow banks,” which are (non-traditional-bank) entities such as 
special-purpose entities (SPEs), finance companies, hedge funds, mutual 
funds, investment banks, and government sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs).15 Some of these products and services are provided through fi-
nancial markets.16 
Shadow banking can sometimes contribute to the social good.17 
Disintermediation, for example, removes the need for bank intermedia-
tion and middleman profit-taking.18 Decentralization can increase con-
sumer welfare by expanding the menu of funds and financial products 
available to individual investors, allowing them to tailor portfolios to 
their own preferences.19 Moreover, decentralized markets can offer new 
funding options for firms lacking access to traditional bank credit and 
capital markets.20 By reducing the size of firms, decentralization can also 
                                                 
 13. Recall that the financial market changes are set forth in the text accompanying notes 1–2, 
supra. 
 14. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619 (2012). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Edward J. Kane, The Inevitability of Shadowy Banking 6 (Mar. 19, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/12fmc/12fmc_kane.pdf (“Almost all 
forms of [what he calls] shadowy banking offer some benefits to society.”). 
 18. ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, NO. 
458: SHADOW BANKING 5 (2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/ 
sr458_July_2010_version.pdf (“While shadow banking activities certainly include activities which 
appear to have limited purpose other than regulatory capital arbitrage, it also includes a range of 
[non-bank] intermediation activities which appear to have significant economic value outside the 
traditional banking system.”). 
 19. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, A Welfare Comparison of Intermediaries and Financial 
Markets in Germany and the U.S., 39 EUR. ECON. REV. 179, 189 (1994) (comparing the decentral-
ized U.S. financial system to Germany’s bank-dominated financial system). 
 20. See, e.g., Nicolas P.B. Bollen & William G. Christie, Market Microstructure of the Pink 
Sheets, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 1326, 1328 (2009) (observing that securities relying on the so-called 
“Pink Sheets” OTC market include “securities that are economically distressed . . . Microcap issues 
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mitigate the “too big to fail” problem. And a decentralized financial sys-
tem, in which losses are distributed among many small financial institu-
tions, may also be more robust in the face of negative shocks. 
On the other hand, shadow banking can sometimes be harmful to 
the social good. To the extent that shadow banking is motivated by regu-
latory arbitrage,21 regulatory arbitrageurs might use deal structures with 
higher transaction costs than the regulated alternative, but that offer a net 
gain to parties because they avoid regulation.22 Regulatory arbitrage also 
disadvantages market participants that lack the wealth, expertise, and 
(often) political connections to capitalize on arbitrage opportunities.23 
Shadow banking might also be harmful to the extent that it reflects 
a shift from more formal to less formal financial markets.24 Benefits of 
                                                                                                             
that do not qualify for listing in other markets and would typically fall under the penny stock um-
brella . . . [and, securities of] companies that are very tightly held and trade very infrequently”); 
David J. Denis & Vassil T. Mihov, The Choice Among Bank Debt, Non-Bank Private Debt, and 
Public Debt: Evidence from New Corporate Borrowings, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 5 (2003) (finding that 
“firms with the highest credit quality borrow from public sources, firms with medium credit quality 
borrow from banks, and firms with the lowest credit quality borrow from non-bank private lenders”). 
 21. Professor Langevoort observes, for example, that  
[w]hat was happening from a regulatory standpoint was product market regulatory arbi-
trage, although there were other economic reasons for this shift as well. The intense safe-
ty and soundness regulation for banks, particularly capital adequacy rules, simply did not 
apply in the USA to financial products intermediated by securities firms, and so they 
could take on much more risk in this process if they wanted. 
Donald C. Langevoort, Global Securities Regulation After the Financial Crisis, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
799, 803 (2010). 
 22. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 275 (2010). As Fleischer 
notes, this can result in an overall welfare loss to society because the benefits of regulation are ne-
gated while the benefits of the private transaction are reduced by the costs of arbitrage. Id.; see also 
Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Cost of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 
240–42 (describing a dynamic economic model of the efficiency of derivatives regulation). 
 23. Fleischer, supra note 22, at 280–82. Donald Langevoort and Robert Thompson urge partic-
ular caution with respect to securities regulation, noting as follows: 
Most all of securities regulation is educated guesswork rather than rigorous cost-benefit 
analysis, because we lack the ability to capture the full range of possible costs or benefits 
with anything remotely resembling precision. That opens the door to bias—whether the 
influence of deliberate rent-seeking, ideological preferences or just preconceived (and 
unfalsifiable) notions—on the part of the many actors who contribute to the process of 
policy formulation. 
Donald Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation 
30–31 (Georgetown Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 12-002, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984686. 
 24. See, e.g., Markham & Harty, supra note 12, at 866 (describing the displacement of tradi-
tional exchange trading). Compare this description with Noeth and Sengupta’s comment: 
However, unlike traditional banking, which involves a simple process of deposit-taking 
and originating loans that are held to maturity, shadow banking employs a much more 
complicated process to achieve maturity transformation. At the deposit end of the shadow 
banking system are wholesale investors (providers of funds) using the repo market and 
money market intermediaries such as money market mutual funds (MMMFs) to provide 
short-term loans that are essentially withdrawable on demand. At the loan origination end 
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formal markets can include transparency (which facilitates regulatory 
oversight and price discovery), quality control via minimum listing re-
quirements, rapid error reporting and correction, dispute resolution 
mechanisms, and self-regulation by market participants.25 
Finally, shadow banking might be harmful to the extent that its de-
centralization makes it harder to control market failures.26 Decentralized 
financial markets, for example, might increase the likelihood that sys-
temic risk will be triggered by making panics, which often serve as the 
trigger that commences a chain of systemic failures,27 more likely.28 
Shadow banking thus has the potential to create both benefit and 
harm. Empirically, we do not yet know which effect is likely to domi-
nate. Any inquiry into financial regulation of shadow banking should 
therefore strive to examine, among other things, how to mitigate the po-
tential harm while preserving the potential benefit.29 Because the market 
failures associated with shadow banking are not all susceptible to legal 
solutions,30 financial regulation will at best provide only partial solu-
tions.31 
                                                                                                             
are finance companies and even traditional banks that engage in the activity of originat-
ing loans, much like the traditional banking system. 
Bryan J. Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta, Is Shadow Banking Really Banking?, REGIONAL ECONOMIST, 
Oct. 2011, at 9. 
 25. Markham & Harty, supra note 12, at 882–87 (discussing formal equity markets). 
 26. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address at the European Central Bank Seminar on Regu-
lation of Financial Services in the E.U.: Surveillance-Resilience-Transparency: A Regulatory 
Framework for Managing Systemic Risk (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://scholarship.law. 
duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2459/ [hereinafter ECB Keynote Address] (showing how market fail-
ures can contribute to systemic failures). 
 27. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 199–201 (2008). 
 28. Professor Dan Awrey argues, implicitly due to decentralization, that shadow banking cre-
ates market fragmentation, interconnectedness, and opacity. See Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation 
and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916649 (arguing that these factors make 
shadow banking especially prone to endogenous shocks); Jon Danielsson et al., Endogenous and 
Systemic Risk, in QUANTIFYING SYSTEMIC RISK (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://www.riskresearch.org/files/JD-HS-JZ-37.pdf (same). That makes it difficult for market partic-
ipants to effectively process information. Cf. Awrey, supra at 9–10 (defining complexity as a func-
tion of information costs and bounded rationality). This allows risks to accumulate unnoticed and 
unchecked. Id. at 12. Awrey argues that these pathologies may lead not only to inefficient contract-
ing among market participants, but also to “fraud, misconduct, and other opportunistic behavior” by 
financial institutions. Id. at 52. When hidden risks suddenly become apparent, market participants 
effectively panic. Id. at 27–28; see also Danielsson et al., supra at 4–6. 
 29. To that end, economists and finance scholars may want to study the balance, whereas legal 
scholars may want to study how shadow banking should be regulated if the balance is indeterminate. 
 30. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 
WIS. L. REV. 815 (2012) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos] (examining the limits 
of law in addressing the types of market failures inherent in the financial system); see also Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity]; Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime 
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2. Financial Market Globalization 
The other important legal inquiry is whether financial regulation is 
keeping pace with increasing financial market globalization. The limited 
international cooperation in response to the recent financial crisis high-
lights the fundamental tension between increasingly globalized financial 
markets and fragmented, state-centric market regulation. In that context, 
state-centric regulation not only is inefficient, it is also potentially anti-
competitive—the latter insofar as nations engaging in that regulation 
may find their local markets diminishing.32 This renews the question of 
whether a “supra-national regulatory regime in the financial services sec-
tor” is now necessary.33 Professors Weber and Arner explain why such a 
regime may be needed: 
[I]nternational financial regulation today is an accretion of institu-
tions, organizations, international standards, and domestic laws and 
rules in many ways not designed to address the requirements of the 
continuing integration of domestic economies into an increasingly 
                                                                                                             
Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Fail-
ure] (explaining why disclosure is insufficient). 
 31. Adrian & Ashcraft, supra note 6, essentially argue that (1) shadow banks are inherently 
fragile because they engage in maturity transformation, thereby exposing themselves to rollover risk 
without having central bank safety nets; (2) shadow banks therefore contracted for what was thought 
to be the equivalent: liquidity and credit put options with traditional banks; (3) because of neglected 
risks (such as failure to see correlations, underappreciated agency problems, and long intermediation 
chains that obscured information), traditional banks underpriced the risk of these liquidity and credit 
arrangements and thus entered into too many of them (which ultimately required tapping public 
funds to help avoid traditional bank failures); and (4) regulatory reform of shadow banking should 
therefore focus on increasing the transparency, thus enabling more appropriate pricing of shadow-
bank liquidity and credit arrangements. I have argued, in contrast, that regulation cannot correct all 
the market inefficiencies. See Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 22 and accompanying text (“Regulation 
can help to control, but cannot completely eliminate those failures.”). Therefore, regulation aimed at 
increasing transparency and enabling more accurate pricing is necessary but insufficient. We also 
need to focus on how regulation can help to mitigate the harmful consequences of mispricing and 
systemic failure resulting from shadow banking. 
 32. However, I leave open the possibility that state-centric regulation can be crafted to signal 
integrity and reliability, thereby making local markets more competitive. Cf. Roberta Romano, 
Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment, in 3 LAW AND ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 27, 43–44 (Peter Nobel et al. eds., 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697348 (suggesting that international regulatory harmonization can also 
harmonize risks among countries, increasing the chances of systemic problems in financial markets). 
 33. Omarova, supra note 4, at 158–60. Increasing financial market globalization raises a host 
of other issues, of course. Professor Avgouleas questions, for example, whether “the gradual elimi-
nation of diversity, due to homogenization, [has] made the global financial system less resistant to 
disturbance.” EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 145 (2012). He 
also argues that the credit-default swap (CDS) market has increased the interconnectedness of global 
financial markets, calling into question whether and how cross-border CDS should be regulated. Id. 
at 103. 
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globalized financial system. . . . [It] lacks any coherent overarching 
economic, institutional, or legal framework.34 
In designing an international standards framework for financial 
regulation, scholars have suggested incorporating goals of financial de-
velopment in addition to financial stability—the latter being the existing 
focus.35 To this end, they point to the European Union regulatory model, 
which focuses on both of those goals.36 As part of its effort to build a 
common market for financial services, the European Union implemented 
a regime based on mutual recognition of national financial laws and reg-
ulations premised on a set of agreed minimum standards for regulation.37 
This approach is best exemplified by the European Union’s single pass-
port system, which permits financial services companies to operate 
across borders by branching in any E.U. state as long as certain minimum 
regulatory criteria are met.38 The passport system has increased cross-
border competition in financial services while maintaining a baseline 
level of stability through regulation, and it ultimately is paving the way 
for more ambitious regulatory harmonization.39 
Ironically, there is a degree of covariance in the financial regulation 
I have discussed. To the extent it increases opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage,40 efforts by international regulators “to strengthen the [global] 
financial system by tightening bank rules may inadvertently serve to 
boost opportunities for unregulated or ‘shadow’ financial players.”41 
Next, consider the future of financial markets from the perspective 
of economics. 
B. An Economic Framework: Rethinking Market Efficiency 
From the perspective of economics (and, to some extent because of 
the scholarly overlap, finance), consider how the financial market chang-
                                                 
 34. Rolf H. Weber & Douglas W. Arner, Toward A New Design for International Financial 
Regulation, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 391, 427 (2007). 
 35. Id. at 453. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 440–41. 
 38. Id. at 441–42. 
 39. Id. at 442. The ongoing financial troubles of the Eurozone should not undermine the valua-
ble lesson provided by the European Union’s single passport system. Cf. ECB Keynote Address, 
supra note 26 (discussing E.U. financial regulation). 
 40. See Schwarcz, supra note 14 (observing that stronger bank regulation can encourage the 
provision of financial services and products by unregulated non-banks). 
 41. See, e.g., Philip Halstrick, Tighter Bank Rules Give Fillip to Shadow Banks, REUTERS 
(Dec. 20, 2011, 9:17 AM), http://uk.reuters.com//2011/12/20/uk-regulation-shadow-banking-
idUKLNE7BJ00T20111220. 
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es are affecting efficiency.42 One might broadly ask, for example, wheth-
er the rise of shadow banking increases or reduces efficiency. I have al-
ready observed, however, that although shadow banking has the potential 
to create both benefit and harm, we do not yet know which effect is like-
ly to dominate. Further empirical inquiry will be needed. 
There are, however, more limited efficiency-related questions that 
might be easier to test. For example, the financial market changes have 
been spurring the creation of complex new financial products.43 Does the 
advent of new financial products itself increase efficiency? Some schol-
ars believe, contrary to rational expectations models, that new financial 
products may not increase efficiency because investors in such products 
might ignore “improbable risks.”44 Scholars also have questioned wheth-
er investors really understand all of the risks.45 Indeed, to the extent new 
financial products, which usually are crafted by skilled financial engi-
neers,46 are more complex than existing products, one might question 
whether they are inherently riskier—if due only to the limited capacity of 
market participants to fully understand them.47 
If one accepts this critique of financial innovation—that new finan-
cial products can contain inherent, largely unrecognized risks—it raises 
the question of whether ex ante regulation of new financial instruments 
might be preferable to the current ex post regulatory approach. I briefly 
consider this question, reverting to the perspective of financial regula-
tion. 
                                                 
 42. Although there are numerous technical definitions of efficiency, most observers consider-
ing the topic of financial innovation seem to assume a relatively basic economic definition: maxim-
izing the total welfare of market participants based on the measurable costs and benefits of the finan-
cial product, defined by reference to price. See, e.g., Laurence S. Moss, Neoclassical Economics, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 701 (Douglas Greenwald ed., 1982) (defining economic efficiency 
in the neoclassical theory of economics). 
 43. See The Ferment of Finance: Moving from Ideas to Products to Markets, ECONOMIST, Feb. 
25, 2012, at 6–7 (citing both new regulations and the need to hedge emerging risks, like increased 
longevity of pension fund beneficiaries, as drivers of financial innovation). 
 44. Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Neglected Risks, Financial Innova-
tion, and Financial Fragility, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 452 (2012) (arguing that investors will neglect im-
probable risks, extrapolating from the failure of investors in mortgage-backed securities to foresee 
the rapidity of the housing market’s deterioration and the price sensitivity of highly rated mortgage-
backed securities to underlying home values). 
 45. Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Finance Made the World Riskier?, 12 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 499 
(2006) (highlighting a number of potential risks posed by innovations in contemporary financial 
markets, including broadening market access to unsophisticated investors, herding behavior, per-
verse incentives to increase risk in markets, and hidden tail risk). 
 46. See generally SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH WIZARDS 
CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT (2010) (offering a journalistic account of 
the rise of so-called “quants” who applied sophisticated mathematical analyses to finance). 
 47. I do not claim that complex new financial products are necessarily systematically riskier 
than investors think. I am simply observing that new financial products that are not fully understood 
by investors could increase the error of risk estimation both on the upside and the downside. 
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Several academic observers have proposed just such an ex ante re-
gime in which new, complex financial instruments would be subject to a 
mandatory approval process.48 Professor Saule Omarova proposes a plan 
that, while not barring any financial activities, would impose a duty on 
innovators to show (1) that their proposed product has economic utility; 
(2) that they have the ability to manage the risks of the product; and (3) 
that their product does not create an “unacceptable risk of increasing sys-
temic vulnerability.”49 Professors Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl offer a 
more stringent preapproval plan that targets those financial derivatives 
that decrease social utility by promoting speculation.50 In their frame-
work, a “Financial Products Regulator” would have the power to “ap-
prove, reject, or approve with certain conditions” financial products 
submitted to its approval process.51 Professor Edward Kane refers to this 
type of approach as “the FDA model applied to finance,”52 a comparison 
Omarova, Posner, and Weyl make directly in their papers.53 
Another efficiency-related question is whether the financial market 
changes create externalities by imposing uncompensated costs on tax-
payers. Professor Kane makes this argument, referring not to “shadow” 
but to what he calls “shadowy” banking.54 The problem, he contends, is 
that certain new financial market instruments, especially in the repo and 
securitization markets, “trade for substantial periods of time as if they 
carried zero counterparty risk” because investors believe that government 
“will be afraid not to absorb all or most of the losses [they] might suf-
fer.”55 Reforms therefore must involve better ways to “impose and en-
                                                 
 48. Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of New Complex Financial 
Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996755 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1996755; Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial 
Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to 21st Century Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2010606 or http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.2139/ssrn.2010606. 
 49. Omarova, supra note 48, at 5. 
 50. Posner & Weyl, supra note 48, at 16. Under the authors’ proposal, the test applied by the 
ex ante regulator 
would be whether the welfare gains from insurance allowed by a new product exceeded 
the likely costs created by the speculation it facilitates. The agency’s evaluation of a fi-
nancial product would begin with a market demand analysis of the sort performed by any 
firm planning to market a new financial product, to identify the likely sources of demand. 
The agency would then classify these sources of demand as [hedging] or [speculation] 
and quantify the benefits and harms arising from each. 
Id. 
 51. Id. at 44. 
 52. E-mail from Edward J. Kane, Professor of Fin., Bos. Coll., to author (Feb. 8, 2012) (on file 
with author). 
 53. Omarova, supra note 48, at 24; Posner & Weyl, supra note 48, at 3–4. 
 54. Kane, supra note 17, at 2. 
 55. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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force stronger and clearer moral duties on unwilling financiers, politi-
cians, regulators, and credit-rating firms.”56 
Yet another efficiency-related question concerns credit bubbles. 
There is some empirical evidence that credit bubbles often precede fi-
nancial crises.57 Economists therefore might wish to study whether credit 
bubbles can be recognized and deflated early, before they trigger a crisis. 
Finally, the recent financial crisis highlighted behavioral challenges 
to ideas of market efficiency. Humans have bounded rationality, follow-
ing the herd in their investment choices and over-relying on heuristics, 
such as rating-agency ratings. Market participants are also prone to pan-
ic. And, due to optimism and availability biases, we are unrealistically 
optimistic when thinking about extreme events with which we have no 
recent experience, devaluing the likelihood and potential consequences 
of those events.58 We need to better understand how to achieve market 
efficiencies notwithstanding these and related cognitive limitations. 
C. A Finance Framework: Rethinking Market Organization 
From the perspective of finance, consider how the financial market 
changes are affecting market organization. There appear to be at least 
two ways: facilitating the funding of long-term capital needs from short-
term market sources, and fragmenting markets.59 
                                                 
 56. Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted). To this end, Kane suggests—although it is as yet unclear how 
to effectuate his suggestion—that taxpayers should hold a stake in firms equal to the stake held by 
the firm’s shareholders. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF 
FINANCIAL CRISES (1978); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS 
DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009). 
 58. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an 
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1366–68, 1386–89 (2011); Geoffrey P. Mil-
ler & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations 
Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 807 (2010). One of the causes of the 
financial crisis may have been intellectual hazard, “the tendency of behavioral biases to interfere 
with accurate thought and analysis within complex organizations.” Miller & Rosenfeld, supra, at 
808. Some examples of behavioral biases include complexity bias, the tendency to analyze a situa-
tion wrongly because of inadequate ability to interpret complex information; incentive bias, the 
tendency to see the world in accordance with their own self-interest; and asymmetry bias, the ten-
dency to rely on preformed and fixed ideas, judgments, or attitudes. Id. at 813–18. During the finan-
cial crisis, actors in complex organizations enabled the spread of systemic risk by failing to properly 
acquire, process, transmit, and implement key risk-related information. Id. at 810. 
 59. My colleague, Bill Brown, contends that leverage exists not only directly (through the 
traditional means of borrowing) and indirectly (through derivatives), but also “infinitely,” by which 
he refers to commodities–futures exchanges where positions are not margined at their intraday max-
imums, but are only margined at the net open position at the close of the day. This unfettered lever-
age allows unnecessary high-frequency and proprietary trading risk. To address this market risk, he 
would impose margin and capital restrictions on maximum intraday commodities–futures positions. I 
have not yet independently examined this risk, but questions may include how to measure, monitor, 
and control the risk on a real-time basis. 
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1. Short-Term Funding of Long-Term Capital Needs 
A potential liquidity discontinuity occurs when markets provide 
short-term funding of long-term capital needs. One might conceptualize 
this as a market organization problem insofar as ideally organized mar-
kets should provide funding that matches the maturities of the needs. In 
reality, though, the interest rate on short-term debt is usually lower than 
that on long-term debt because, other things being equal, it is easier to 
assess an obligor’s ability to repay in the short term than in the long 
term.60 Long-term debt is thus (again, other things being equal) riskier. 
Firms therefore sometimes prefer cheaper short-term funding even 
though that potentiates a liquidity discontinuity—that the firm will be 
unable to “roll over” the short-term debt by borrowing new debt to repay 
the maturing debt. This preference ideally should reflect the firm’s belief 
that it will have little problem in rolling over the short-term debt. To 
some extent, however, it might reflect a calculated externality, in that the 
firm saves real money through short-term borrowings whereas, in the 
unlikely event the firm cannot roll over the debt, at least part of the harm 
from the firm’s default will impact third parties.61 Thus, even if the firm 
perfectly understands the risk of funding its long-term projects with 
short-term debt, it may not pay the full cost of that mismatch.62 
For example, Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick argue that shadow 
banking, in the form of repo lending,63 might increase systemic risk 
                                                 
 60. Short-term interest rates may also be lower than long-term rates because the term structure 
of interest rates (also known as the yield curve) is usually increasing despite the fact that it repre-
sents the risk-free rate for various horizons. E-mail from Simon Gervais, Assoc. Professor of Fin., 
Fuqua Sch. of Bus., Duke Univ., to author (Apr. 14, 2012) (on file with author). 
 61. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 206 (“[T]he externalities of systemic failure include social 
costs that can extend far beyond market participants. Thus, market participants will not want to 
internalize those costs and will take an insufficient amount of care to prevent them. As a result, there 
is a type of tragedy of the commons, in which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources ac-
crue to individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resource, 
whereas the costs of exploitation, which affect the real economy, are distributed among an even 
wider class of persons.” (citations omitted)). 
 62. If investors in the short-term funding fully understand the rollover risk, they may demand 
that it be priced into the firm’s cost—for example, charging the firm an incrementally higher interest 
rate, or conditioning their funding on the firm purchasing a liquidity facility (which would facilitate 
the rollover if the firm is unable to do so). Because of asymmetric information between the firm and 
its investors, however, the investors may not fully understand that risk. 
 63. Repo lending refers to a transaction in which Party A advances money to Party B in ex-
change for securities with an agreement, termed a repurchase agreement, that Party B will subse-
quently repay Party A and get back the securities. One way to view the transaction is as a loan by 
Party A to Party B collateralized by the securities. Another way to view the transaction is as a pur-
chase of the securities by Party A with a simultaneous agreement by Party B to subsequently buy 
back the securities. 
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through short-term funding of long-term capital needs.64 In the recent 
financial crisis, the precipitous decline in value of mortgage-backed se-
curities used as collateral for short-term repo loans prompted repo lend-
ers to demand additional collateral.65 Gorton and Metrick maintain that 
these demands approximated bank runs—in which panicked depositors 
withdraw funds from their banks—to the extent bank repo-borrowers 
were forced to sell assets to generate the additional collateral.66 These 
forced asset sales also further depressed asset prices, creating a shock 
that spread rapidly through the interconnected financial system, impact-
ing shadow-banking entities (like structured investment vehicles and 
money-market mutual funds) that relied on short-term debt.67 
Financial market organization should be rethought to help mitigate 
externalities caused by short-term funding of long-term capital needs. 
The problem, however, does not arise from shadow banking per se. Alt-
hough some, including Gorton and Metrick, may regard short-term fund-
ing as a central characteristic of shadow banking, shadow banking can 
(and does) provide both short- and long-term funding,68 and even tradi-
tional banks fund themselves through short-term deposits (with resulting 
liquidity discontinuities being the real bank runs).69 
                                                 
 64. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, in BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 261, 261 (2010). 
 65. Id. at 279 (identifying these demands as the “epicenter” of the financial crisis); cf. Gary 
Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 448 
(2012) (arguing that these demands were caused primarily by opacity about the exposure of different 
borrowers to the flagging real estate market and the value of borrowers’ collateral in the event of 
defaults). 
 66. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 64, at 279. 
 67. Id. at 279–80 (observing that structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that relied on short-
term debt to finance purchases of asset-backed securities and money-market mutual funds were 
forced to liquidate assets to repay panicked investors who redeemed their shares). I have made simi-
lar arguments in Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 30, at 232–33 (discussing 
information uncertainty through the example of mark-to-market accounting and margin calls by 
broker-dealers). 
 68. In securitization transactions, for example, the issued securities often have long-term ma-
turities. 
 69. The so-called Volcker Rule, which would limit a systemically important firm’s right to 
make short-term investments for its own account, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2010) (codifying steps to im-
plement rules limiting proprietary trading), addresses a somewhat related “short-term” question. One 
might be skeptical, though, of any such paternalistic regulation aimed at protecting a sophisticated 
financial firm from itself. The only scenario where that type of regulation might be justified is where 
firms can externalize systemic-risk costs, but there are more direct and arguably effective ways to 
require firms to internalize those costs. See Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 30 
(proposing a privatized systemic risk fund for that purpose); see also infra notes 105–07 and accom-
panying text. 
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Short-term funding of long-term capital needs is thus a fundamental 
problem of the financial system.70 In the recent financial crisis, for ex-
ample, it is alleged that “substantial contraction” in the asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) market in the last five months of 2007 
“played a central role in transforming concerns about the credit quality of 
mortgage-related assets into a global financial crisis.”71 Whether or not 
one agrees with that claim, empirical research indicates that this contrac-
tion was caused by investor concern that issuers of the ABCP did not 
have sufficient liquidity to cover shortfalls from maturing mortgage 
loans.72 Issuers with “full liquidity support” did not appear to experience 
the same contraction.73 Questions for further inquiry might therefore in-
clude whether financial markets could be organized better to provide li-
quidity to address discontinuities.74 
2. Market Fragmentation 
There is an extensive ongoing debate about the relative merits of fi-
nancial market fragmentation and consolidation. Even for equity securi-
ties, approximately 30% of all trades are being executed outside of stock 
exchanges.75 
Professors O’Hara and Ye found, empirically, that these “fragment-
ed stocks generally have lower transaction costs and faster execution 
speed” than stock traded on formal exchanges,76 although the “specific 
effects of this fragmentation differ across firm sizes, and it differs as well 
for NYSE-listed and Nasdaq-listed firms.”77 They conclude that “market 
                                                 
 70. Cf. Morgan Ricks, Visiting Assistant Professor, Harvard Law Sch., Comments at the Bos-
ton University School of Law Symposium: Shadow Banking: Past, Present, Future (Feb. 24, 2012) 
(arguing that the instability of short-term “money-like” securities is the central problem for financial 
regulatory policy) (notes on file with author). Possible responses might include better standards on 
match-funding coverage and better internal controls on collateral valuation and margining policies. 
 71. Daniel M. Covitz, Nellie Liang & Gustavo A. Suarez, The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: 
Panic in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market 16 (Fed. Reserve Bank Fin. and Econ. Discus-
sion Series, Working Paper No. 2009-36, 2009), available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1364576. 
 72. Id. at 29. 
 73. Id. The authors suggest imposing standards on liquidity support as one possible solution. 
Id. at 31. 
 74. Cf. Ing-Haw Cheng & Konstantin Milbradt, The Hazards of Debt: Rollover Freezes, Incen-
tives, and Bailouts, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1070, 1071 (2012) (arguing that making a moderate amount 
of emergency liquidity financing available in the event of a rollover freeze should be value-
increasing, even when including potential losses of the liquidity provider). 
 75. Maureen O’Hara & Mao Ye, Is Market Fragmentation Harming Market Quality?, 100 J. 
FIN. ECON. 459, 460 (2011). 
 76. Id. at 460–61. 
 77. Id. (“[For large firms,] fragmentation is associated with faster execution time. For small 
firms, effective spreads are lower, but there are no significant effects on speed. For NYSE-listed 
stocks, large, liquid stocks appear to gain the most from fragmentation, and for Nasdaq-listed stocks, 
small, illiquid stocks benefit from fragmentation.”). 
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quality, as measured by effective spreads, is not harmed by market frag-
mentation.”78 In contrast, however, Professors Hendershott and Jones 
find that market fragmentation causes a reduction in transparency, wors-
ening overall price discovery.79 The net impact of market fragmentation 
is thus far from resolved. 
D. An Accounting Framework: Rethinking  
Financial Information Disclosure  
As mentioned, financial information disclosure is primarily the 
province of accounting. I broadly framed the inquiry by asking whether 
existing accounting rules and principles adequately disclose financial 
information, especially given increasingly decentralized and fragmented 
financial markets and mismatched funding, and whether those rules and 
principles should be harmonized for global financial markets. Within that 
broad inquiry,80 let me attempt to identify two specific concerns: fair 
value accounting and special purpose entities. Thereafter, I will digress 
by examining the limits of disclosure more generally. 
First, the recent financial crisis has unleashed a vigorous debate 
over the efficacy of fair value accounting (FVA), popularly known as 
“mark to market.” Many have criticized FVA for putting artificial pres-
sure on firms’ balance sheets in times of market turmoil by forcing firms 
to recognize short-term fluctuations in the value of assets with long ma-
turities.81 Others note the difficulty of valuing assets for which there is 
not a transparent, liquid market.82 Although accurately capturing the val-
ue of assets held by a firm, and communicating that information to inves-
                                                 
 78. Id. 
 79. Terrence Hendershott & Charles M. Jones, Island Goes Dark: Transparency, Fragmenta-
tion, and Regulation, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 743, 744 (2005). 
 80. See, e.g., Katherine Schipper, Required Disclosures in Financial Reports, 82 ACCT. REV. 
301, 301, 312–15, 322 (2007) (arguing that accountants lack a comprehensive theory of mandatory 
disclosures and that many questions remain as to how preparers, auditors, and users of financial 
reports view disclosures, and concluding that disclosures are generally underweighted by financial 
statement users). 
 81. See, e.g., R. Christopher Whalen, The Subprime Crisis—Cause, Effect and Consequences, 
17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 219, 225 (2008) (“Fair value accounting is 
driving investor fears about the solvency of many financial institutions.”); Adair Turner, Case Busi-
ness School Lecture 2012: Shadow Banking and Financial Instability 16 (Mar. 14, 2012) (on file 
with author) (observing that the “interaction of secured lending practices and mark-to-market ac-
counting . . . exacerbates the risk of procyclicality and the volatility of credit creation”); Peter J. 
Wallison, Fair Value Accounting: A Critique, AEI: FIN. SERVICES OUTLOOK, July 28, 2008, at 2, 
available at http://www.aei.org/files/2008/07/28/20080728_23336JulyFSOg.pdf (“[M]arket-based 
movements in asset values can create substantial volatility in balance sheets and earnings reports—
again, depending on a company’s business model.”). 
 82. See George J. Benston, The Shortcomings of Fair Value Accounting Described in SFAS 
157, 27 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 103 (2008). 
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tors and regulators in a relevant format, are crucial functions of account-
ing,83 there is no perfect method that always accomplishes these goals.84 
Trade-offs are inherent in setting accounting standards.85 Accounting 
scholars may wish to continue studying and debating FVA and its trade-
offs (including in a global context), identifying and weighing FVA’s 
costs and benefits, and analyzing when and how it should be applied.86 
Second, accountants have been struggling with how to disclose fi-
nancial information about special-purpose entities (SPEs).87 SPEs are at 
the heart of shadow banking, which can cause financial market decentral-
ization and fragmentation.88 In that context, one of the central questions 
is how to determine whether SPEs and their liabilities should be consoli-
dated, for accounting (and thus public reporting) purposes, with their 
sponsoring firms. The answer can have profound consequences because 
non-consolidation means that an SPE’s liabilities are not reflected on the 
sponsoring firm’s balance sheet—commonly referred to as off-balance-
sheet financing. Yet the sponsoring firm might ultimately feel compelled 
to backstop those liabilities, even if it is not legally obligated to do so. 
For example, at the outset of the recent financial crisis many banks back-
stopped their affiliated “structured investment vehicle” SPEs solely to 
protect the banks’ reputations.89 This heightened the crisis by unexpect-
edly stripping away bank assets.90 
                                                 
 83. See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., RULES OF PROCEDURE 2–3 (2012), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495; INT’L ACCT. STANDARDS 
BD., CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING: THE REPORTING ENTITY (EXPOSURE 
DRAFT) 9 (2010) (draft for public comment), available at http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/ 
363A9F3B-D41C-41E7-9715-79715E815BB1/0/EDConceptualFrameworkMar10.pdf. 
 84. Christian Laux & Christian Leuz, The Crisis of Fair Value Accounting: Making Sense of 
the Debate, 34 ACCT. ORG. & SOC. 826, 828–29 (2009). 
 85. Id. (comparing fair value accounting with historical cost accounting). 
 86. Laux and Leuz offer a good example of this kind of work in their analysis of the FVA 
debate. See id.; see also Mary E. Barth & Wayne R. Landsman, How Did Financial Reporting Con-
tribute to the Financial Crisis, 19 EUR. ACCT. REV. 399, 403–07 (2010) (analyzing FVA rules in 
GAAP and IFRS to determine what role they played in the financial crisis); Joerg-Markus Hitz, The 
Decision Usefulness of Fair Value Accounting: A Theoretical Perspective, 16 EUR. ACCT. REV. 323 
(2007) (critiquing arguments in favor of FVA asserted by both the FASB and IASB); Nicolas Véron, 
Fair Value Accounting Is the Wrong Scapegoat for This Crisis, 5 ACCT. EUR. 63 (2008) (discussing 
the role of FVA in the financial crisis in both Europe and the United States). 
 87. Cf. Barth & Landsman, supra note 86, at 409 (examining how accounting rules limited the 
amount of information that banks had to disclose about assets sold to SPEs in securitization transac-
tions). 
 88. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text; cf. Schwarcz, supra note 14 (also observing 
that SPEs engage in shadow banking by providing financial products and services through the finan-
cial markets). 
 89. Shannon D. Harrington & Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup to Consolidate Seven SIVs on Bal-
ance Sheet (Update3), BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 13, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=21070001&sid=aT0Ix2iDnZRk. Citigroup backstopped its affiliated “structured invest-
ment vehicle” SPEs (also called SIVs) in the amount of $49 billion, following similar decisions by 
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I also want to say a few words about the limits of disclosure gener-
ally, beyond accounting for financial information.91 Disclosing risks tra-
ditionally has been viewed under U.S. and most foreign securities laws 
as the primary financial market-regulatory mechanism.92 It works by re-
ducing, if not eliminating, asymmetric information among market play-
ers, making the risks transparent to all. Empirical evidence suggests that 
investors place a significant value on effective disclosure and react nega-
tively to instances of fraud, even when such fraud impacts cash flows 
minimally.93 
But the efficacy of disclosure is limited by the increasing complexi-
ty of financial markets and market transactions. In the recent financial 
crisis, for example, there is little question that virtually everything re-
garding complex mortgage-backed securities was disclosed. Yet many 
sophisticated institutional investors bought these securities based primar-
ily on their ratings, without fully understanding them.94 
There are a host of reasons why this occurred. Analysts overrelied 
on heuristics such as rating-agency ratings. Analysts and investors fol-
lowed the herd in their investment choices. Conflicts of interest were 
driven by short-term management compensation schemes (such as pay-
ing yearly bonuses based on deals booked during the year, even though a 
deal could underperform in the long term), especially for technically so-
phisticated secondary managers. These conflicts are unlike the traditional 
                                                                                                             
HSBC Holdings PLC and WestLB AG to backstop their SIVs, notwithstanding that doing so re-
duced Citigroup’s capital ratio (which regulators monitor to gauge its ability to withstand losses on 
bad loans) and also caused Moody’s to lower Citigroup’s long-term credit rating. Id. 
 90. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Use and Abuse of Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, 
97 MINN. L. REV. 369 (2012). 
 91. In general, accounting covers financial information disclosure and securities law covers all 
other forms of disclosure. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission specifically 
delegates responsibility for financial information disclosure to the accounting profession. See infra 
note 104. 
 92. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate 
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999). 
 93. See, e.g., Gennaro Bernile & Gregg A. Jarrell, The Impact of the Options Backdating Scan-
dal on Shareholders, 47 J. ACCT. & ECON. 2 (2009) (concluding that “investors’ reaction to [stock 
options] backdating news may reflect an increase in perceived agency costs and information risk, if 
the accusations impair the reputation and credibility of targeted companies”). 
 94. See generally Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis and the Disclosure Para-
digm in European Financial Regulation: The Case for Reform, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 1 
(2009); Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure, supra note 30. David Hirshleifer and Siew Hong Teoh 
theorize that, under conditions of bounded rationality, full disclosure in exacting detail of the fea-
tures of a complex security may not result in rational investment decisions and could, potentially, 
make such decisions less likely when investors’ attention and processing power are constrained by 
time and other costs. David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Limited Attention, Information Disclo-
sure, and Financial Reporting, 36 J. ACCT. & ECON. 337, 378–80 (2003) (concluding that the form 
of information-equivalent disclosures is significant when investors’ attention and processing power 
are limited). 
2013] Analyzing Financial Market Transformation 317 
focus of scholars and politicians on conflicts between senior managers 
and shareholders. The retention by underwriters of residual risk portions 
may have fostered false confidence in investors, in effect creating a “mu-
tual misinformation” problem. By signaling their (unjustified) confidence 
in the securities being sold, the underwriters inadvertently misled inves-
tors into buying those securities.95 
Requiring increased disclosure might therefore be appropriate, but 
only if that disclosure is better directed at the audience’s understanding 
and is properly supplemented—such as by addressing the conflicts of 
interest that are inherent in short-term compensation structures, especial-
ly of secondary managers.96 Requiring enhanced internal controls that 
cabin managers’ discretion in reporting could also improve the quality of 
financial disclosures. Some empirical evidence supports the link between 
internal controls on disclosure quality, though only at the cost of reduced 
conservatism in financial disclosure due to managers’ lack of discretion 
in reporting.97 Further empirical inquiry may be merited. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
I have attempted to help frame an inquiry into what we, as scholars, 
should try to rethink about financial markets. To that end, I have focused 
primarily on the ways in which financial markets have been changing. 
The fact that financial markets tend to change over time not only rein-
forces the importance of this symposium; it also indicates the importance 
of periodically reexamining these markets.98 In an arguably analogous 
                                                 
 95. See generally Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 30. Furthermore, in the context 
of systemic risk, individual market participants who fully understand that risk will be motivated to 
protect themselves but not the system as a whole. See supra note 61. The solution to that dilemma is 
to try to require market participants to internalize this systemic externality. See infra notes 103–04 
and accompanying text. 
 96. See Hirshleifer & Teoh, supra note 94, at 380 (suggesting that redundancy and information 
aggregation may actually improve the ability of investors to process complex financial disclosures). 
 97. Jennifer Altamuro & Anne Beatty, How Does Internal Control Regulation Affect Financial 
Reporting?, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 58, 59 (2010) (examining the impact of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation Improvement Act on bank financial reporting and finding “reduced discretion 
creates a greater association between current reported accrual numbers and future cash flow num-
bers,” which leads to the reported accrual numbers becoming less conservative). But see Ryan 
LaFond & Haifeng You, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, Bank Inter-
nal Controls and Financial Reporting Quality, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 75, 83 (2010) (“Internal con-
trols cannot prevent bad decisions. At the very best, internal controls can merely make it more 
difficult to make bad decisions. Internal controls cannot prevent fraud, but they likely can make 
fraud easier to detect and more difficult to carry out. What internal controls do not do is change the 
incentives. While they may have a second-order effect of discouraging certain behaviors by increas-
ing oversight, controls do not eliminate these behaviors.”). 
 98. Cf. Turner, supra note 81, at 35–36 (observing that “it is the nature of modern global fi-
nance[] that it continually mutates to create new risks and new interconnections [and to] inform that 
response we need to keep the system under permanent surveillance”). 
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context, for example, the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) periodically reexamines commercial law in the 
United States in light of changing commercial practices.99 As a result, the 
UCC is frequently amended to respond to commercial reality,100 making 
it one of America’s most continuously successful business-law stat-
utes.101 Perhaps financial market changes should be periodically reex-
amined too. 
Also, throughout the address I have mentioned the potential for fi-
nancial market changes to trigger systemic collapses. The very increase 
in the size and significance of financial markets as a source of capital is 
making these markets more central to systemic concerns. In other con-
texts, I have argued for responses such as a market liquidity provider of 
last resort to help stabilize panicked financial markets102 and a systemic 
risk fund to help internalize systemic costs and motivate cross-
monitoring.103 
In the United States, there are strong precedents for requiring the 
private sector to contribute to funds that would help to internalize exter-
nalities. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, for example, re-
quires member banks to contribute to a Deposit Insurance Fund to ensure 
                                                 
 99. Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of 
Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909, 917 (1995) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Fundamental Inquiry]; 
cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 947, 949–50 (1999) [herinafter Schwarcz, Impact of Securitization] (describing how revised 
UCC Article 9’s expanded definition of “account” and addition of “payment intangibles” and “prom-
issory notes” to its scope brought many securitization transactions under the ambit of the UCC’s 
secured transaction rules); James J. White, The Influence of International Practice on the Revision of 
Article 5 of the UCC, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 189, 195 (1995) (explaining how bank practice 
regarding letters of credit, codified in the Uniform Customs and Practice, “influence[d] . . . almost 
every change in Article 5”). 
 100. These amendments occur approximately once a decade. Schwarcz, Fundamental Inquiry, 
supra note 99, at 917–18. 
 101. Accounting already includes periodic updating, perhaps because accounting itself is, at 
least in the United States, a form of private ordering in which government delegates to the account-
ing profession the regulation of financial information disclosure by firms. See, e.g., Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 320 (2002). The profession itself is therefore 
motivated to continue to earn the trust of the delegating government agency. 
 102. See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 30, at 247–56. 
 103. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 487 (2012); cf. Inter-
national Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Sovereigns, Funding, and Systemic 
Liquidity (Oct. 2010), ch. 2, at 1, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/02/ 
index.htm (proposing that to “address the externality that some firms impose on the system as a 
whole, a measure of systemic liquidity risks attributable to them needs to be devised and perhaps a 
surcharge or insurance premia imposed”). In 2011, Congressman Peter DeFazio introduced a bill in 
the U.S. House of Representatives that would impose a 0.03% tax on the purchase or transfer of 
securities on U.S. trading facilities by U.S. persons. Wall Street Trading and Speculators Tax, H.R. 
3313, 112th Cong. (2011). Tom Harkin introduced an identical bill in the Senate. S. 1787, 112th 
Cong. (2011). The bills have been referred to the Ways and Means and Finance committees, respec-
tively. 
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that depositors of failed banks are repaid. In a systemic risk context, the 
likelihood that systemically important firms—including those that be-
lieve they are “too big to fail”—will have to make additional contribu-
tions to a systemic risk fund to replenish bailout monies should motivate 
those firms to monitor each other and help control each other’s risky be-
havior.104 
Professor Whitehead similarly argues that financial regulation 
needs to be fundamentally rethought with a view to directly addressing 
systemic risks within financial markets. Regulators, he contends, “must 
begin to address whether there are now market-based risks—beyond any 
single intermediary—that raise the same systemic concerns that underlie 
bank and insurance regulation, a prospective look that differs from the 
reactive process that has characterized much of financial regulation to 
date.”105 He believes, as I do, that the systemic risk regulations proposed 
by the Obama administration (and later adopted in the Dodd-Frank Act) 
do not go far enough in this direction because they focus more on sys-
temically important financial firms than on financial markets.106 
                                                 
 104. Cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s 
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 156 
(2011) (calling for a systemic emergency insurance fund that is funded by the financial industry). I 
understand that the European Commission has also been considering the idea of a privatized system-
ic risk fund in connection with its proposal to tax the financial sector. 
 105. Charles Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010). 
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